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The spectacular attacks on New York City on 11 Sep-
tember 2001 carried out by 19 suicide bombers be-
longing to the al-Qaeda network kicked off the cen-
tury. Other, more recent attacks in different European 
cities, this time claimed by the Islamic State, have 
made terrorist acts daily news across the globe. De-
spite the differences in organization (a network such 
as al-Qaeda or grouped by territories such as Islamic 
State), these youth, engaged on the path of violence 
in the name of jihad, are guided by the force of the 
singular narrative of membership in the Ummah, 
the world-wide Muslim community, that lends all its 
strength to the appropriation of an ideology and the 
transition to violence. They are fuelled by discourses 
of “humiliated Islam,” of the war in Iraq and of the Is-
raeli-Palestinian conflict and by a sentiment of re-
venge. By the same token, social networks, the main 
sites for dissemination of radical discourse and 
recruitment, play an important role in their commit-
ment to the jihad cause. The rush towards Syria since 
2011, where the Caliphate has been established, 
reflects a mobilization that follows the logic of any so-
cial movement aspiring to the emergence of a new 
society,1 using the rhetoric of “restoring justice” and 
“obtaining revenge” for the domination suffered.
According to the report published by The Soufan 
Group in December 2015, some 5,000 young peo-
ple had arrived from Europe to join the cause, de-
claring themselves “foreign fighters” in the ranks of 
the Islamic State in Syria.2 According to another re-
port from the US Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee published in February 2016,3 over 38,200 “for-
eign fighters” – 6,900 of them from Western coun-
tries – travelled to Syria from about a hundred differ-
ent countries. In Europe, France and Belgium are 
the most significant recruitment pools; in the Middle 
East and North Africa, it is Jordan, Egypt and Tuni-
sia; and in Asia, it is Pakistan, India and Bangladesh 
from where youth go into action for the Caliphate 
and its lands, the territory that has become the “land 
of origin,” the land of the Ummah diaspora, regard-
less of the national origins of its members.
Radicalization: The Birth of a Concept
The term “radicalization” appears in official and sci-
entific discourse in association with the ‘home-
grown terrorists’ who carried out the London at-
tacks of 7 July 2005. To the British authorities, rad-
icalization has become synonymous to jihadization 
since then.4 “Homegrown” jihadists are described 
as individuals living locally, acting alone or in small 
groups, always autonomously, with limited means 
and as amateurs, particularly insofar as the manu-
facture of bombs. Emerging from a decentralized 
1 Quintan WiktoroWiCz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2003.
2 “Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq,” The Soufan Group (TSG), December 2015, 
http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf. According to the report, there were 1,700 from 
France, 470 from Belgium, 760 from the United Kingdom and 760 from Germany.
3 “Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria: Where do they come from?” Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty, www.rferl.org/a/foreign-fighters-syria-
iraq-is-isis-isil-infographic/26584940.html 
4 Sam MullinS. “Home-grown Terrorism: Issues and implications,” Perspectives on Terrorism, 2007, Vol.1, No. 3, p. 1-13
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al-Qaeda organized as a vast network at the time, 
they are connected to other groups or individuals in 
other places through networks linking these local 
cells. According to Robert S. Mueller III, “the infor-
mation age means [people] don’t need training 
camps to become a terrorist”;5 virtual communica-
tion allows them to be in contact with the network.
A new phenomenon calls for new vocabulary. The 
process turning this youth to violence is now called 
“radicalization.” The concept specifically refers to a 
homegrown process, since this radicalization takes 
place in-country or at home.6 Most experts associ-
ate this process with political, social and religious 
ideals and aspirations, and with the use of violence 
to attain these goals.7 There are other definitions as 
well: “Radicalization is a personal process in which 
individuals adopt extreme political, social, and/or re-
ligious ideals and aspirations, and where the attain-
ment of particular goals justifies the use of indis-
criminate violence.”8
One study of this phenomenon divides it into four 
stages: 1) individuals become aware of a radical ide-
ology; 2) they express an interest in the cause; 3) 
they end up accepting the extreme beliefs and norms 
dictated by it; and 4) they begin acting in accord-
ance with these norms.9 Radicalization can thus be 
defined as the internalization of a “set of beliefs, a 
militant mindset that embraces violent jihad as the 
paramount test of one’s conviction.”10 For Arun 
Kundnani, a British expert on terrorism, “the concept 
of radicalisation has become the master signifier of 
the late ‘war on terror’ and provided a new lens 
through which to view Muslim minorities.”11 
Since the 11 September attacks, homegrown terror-
ists can be seen taking action here and there in their 
countries of residence – often also their countries of 
nationality and citizenship. Sometimes qualified as 
‘lone wolves’ because they act individually, they are 
often actually part of a network that has allowed them 
to travel to the lands of jihad and prepare their action 
in their country of residence and/or the land of their 
citizenship. Using the “al-Qaeda label,” which since 
the 2000s has become a means of legitimizing local 
organizations and/or groups, they at first often act in 
groups, in “cliques,” to use Marc Sageman’s expres-
sion,12 or in bands spontaneously formed in neigh-
bourhoods, mosques or at associations where they 
gather. Since 2011, they make return trips from Eu-
rope to Syria thanks to their European passport or 
their double nationality. Lately, the terrorist from Yve-
lines, outside of Paris, who killed a police couple, 
those who slit the throat of a priest in Saint-Etienne-
du-Rouvray, or Mohamed Bouhlel, the lorry-driving 
terrorist in Nice, demonstrate that the phenomenon of 
bands, cliques or groups of friends (as in Madrid and 
London) or of siblings (such as the Kouachi and Ab-
delsalem brothers) is giving way to radicalized indi-
viduals, alone in front of their computer screens, at 
home, isolated. Their terrorist action is individual, as in 
the case of Nice, Berlin, London or Stockholm, even 
if their action is immediately claimed by the Islamic 
State. In the majority of cases, they are young people 
with an immigrant background, “Europe’s Angry Mus-
lims,” to use the title of a work by Robert Leiken.13 
Indeed, the 19 jihadists who carried out the 11 Sep-
tember attacks had travelled the world: they had 
gone to training camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
Yemen. They were not settled anywhere. Perpetra-
tors in Europe were first-generation (such as the Ma-
drid attackers) or second-generation immigrants 
(such as the London perpetrators). Having followed 
the fabric of transnational networks, they had crossed 
5 Robert Mueller (Director of the FBI), cited by Evan F. kohlMAnn, “‘Homegrown’ Terrorism: Theory and Cases in the War on Terror’s Newest 
Front,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 2008, p. 95-109.
6 Risa A. BrookS, “Muslim ‘Homegrown’ Terrorism in the United States,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 2, Autumn 2011, p. 7-47.
7 Lindsay ClutterBuCk, “An Overview of Violent Jihad in the UK,” in Magnus RAnStorp (ed.), Understanding Violent Radicalisation, Routledge, 
2010, p. 158
8 Alex S. Wilner and Claire-Jehanne duBouloz, “Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative Learning,” Global Change, Peace & Security, Vol. 22, 
lss 1, 2010, p. 38.
9 Scott helFStein, Edges of Radicalization: Ideas, Individuals and Networks in Violent Extremism, The Combatting Terrorism Center at 
Westminster Point, February 2012, www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/CTC_EdgesofRadicalization.pdf. 
10 Brian Michael JenkinS. “Building an Army of Believers: Jihadist Radicalization and Recruitment” (testimony, US House of Representatives, 5 
April 2007), cited in A. S. Wilner and C-J. duBouloz, art. cit.
11 Arun kundnAni, cited in: Alex P. SChMid, “Radicalization De-radicalization and Counter-Radicalization: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature 
Review,” ICCT Research Paper, March 2013, The Hague, p. 1. www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-
Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf 
12 Marc SAgeMAn, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.
13 Robert leiken, Europe’s Angry Muslims: The Revolt of the Second Generation, New York, Oxford University Press, 2012.
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paths in hub cities where they had been recruited for 
jihad.14 Ten years after the London attacks, the Char-
lie Hebdo attacks in January 2015 and those on the 
Bataclan concert hall, the Stade de France stadium 
and nightlife venues in Paris in November 2015 have 
been called the French 11 September, with IS claim-
ing authorship this time, were carried out, as in Lon-
don, by three young, “homegrown” French terrorists 
in the case of Charlie Hebdo and eight others in the 
Bataclan case. According to Leiken, these “home-
grown terrorists” in France, Great Britain and Ger-
many, despite different contexts, express their dis-
content similarly, i.e. through violence, turning old 
grievances – such as the colonial past – into new 
aspirations, namely, a will for local and transnational 
autonomy. Islamic converts join the parade.
Sometimes qualified as “lone wolves” 
because they act individually, they are 
often actually part of a network that 
has allowed them to travel to the 
lands of jihad and prepare their action 
in their country of residence and/or 
the land of their citizenship
New technologies facilitate recruiting youth to the 
“army of the Ummah” and operations to draw them 
into jihad. A great many studies show that they are 
recruited via Internet sites, and that these sites pro-
duce the same effect on the young jihadists as 
“home-base” socialization insofar as building an 
“imagined community.” It is through cybercafés that 
they confirm their engagement. It is on social net-
works that they share their common experiences of 
discrimination in Europe, and injustice and suffering 
in Palestine, Iraq or Chechnya. On the web, they de-
velop communication techniques, invent new pro-
grams, continue the discourse of Bin Laden, Azzam, 
Zawahiri… It is on these sites that they are indoctri-
nated and express their belonging and loyalty, first 
to al-Qaeda, then to the Caliphate; it is on these 
sites as well that they invent new heroes and join 
networks in social media. It is always on these sites 
that they assert their loyalty to the cause mobilizing 
them remotely and that lend them the assurance of 
belonging to a global community. 
More recent studies have focused attention on pris-
ons as places of radicalization of youth jailed for 
criminal causes.15 A study shows that 46 young 
people out of 76 were in prison before getting in-
volved in jihad. The same study emphasizes that it is 
at the prisons that the “recruiters” as well as extrem-
ist imams find “vulnerable” youth “angry” at their so-
ciety and attempt to indoctrinate them.16 It is also in 
prisons that networks and solidarities are redefined.
Profiles – Networks – Paths
It is very difficult to define the precise profile of 
homegrown terrorists and clearly establish their mo-
tivations. Numerous studies coincide in emphasiz-
ing the diversity of personal backgrounds, nationali-
ties, ages, study levels, professions, socio-econom-
ic levels and personalities.17 
In Great Britain, an official report by the British Sec-
retary of State published in 2011 entitled “Prevent 
Strategy” examined the social background of al-Qae-
da-friendly youth in the UK: 30% were known to be 
university students or students of higher education, 
15% had vocational training diplomas, 10% were 
students at the time of their arrest. Some of them 
were drawn to terrorism before beginning higher ed-
ucation, others were radicalized at university or the 
equivalent.18 By the same token, the official report of 
the 11 September Commission describes the jihad-
ists of that attack as engineers, students, and reveals 
personal, familial and tribal links among them, and 
their association with various organizations, NGOs 
or businesses, as well as with leaders and other mili-
14 Riva Kastoryano. Que faire des corps de djihadistes ? Territoire et identité, Paris, Fayard 2015
15 Farhad khoSrokhAvAr. Prisons de France. Violence, radicalisation, déshumanisation : surveillants et détenus parlent, Paris, Robert Laffont, 2017
16 Rajan BASrA, Peter R. NeuMAnn and Claudia Brunner. Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures. European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror 
Nexus, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, London, 2016 
17 Petter neSSer, “Joining Jihadi Terrorist Cells in Europe,” in Magnus RAnStorp (ed.), Understanding Violent Radicalisation, Routledge, 2010, 
p. 81-114.
18 “Prevent Strategy,” report by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, June 2011,
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf 
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tants. In contrast, those who perpetrated the Madrid 
attacks of 11 March 2004 are qualified as grassroot 
jihadists, that is, a group consisting of individuals 
who attack their country of residence but ultimately 
share the strategic goals of global jihad.19 Their or-
ganization type differs from that of the al-Qaeda cells 
insofar as the members reside in the country where 
they will perpetrate their attacks. The studies have 
revealed the great complexity of these networks, 
characterized by friendly relations and ties with the 
countries of origin. Scott Atran also used nationali-
ties to establish ties within the network and identify 
individuals playing the role of “bridges” between the 
different circles of friends.20 He notes that family re-
lations, whether close or distant, and neighbourhood 
relations dating back to the country of origin or na-
tionality constitute mechanisms for the formation of 
groups. The 11 March networks were the result of 
relations incubated with a combination of childhood 
friends, groups of young people, neighbourhood ac-
quaintances, fellow prison inmates, or relatives and 
personal relations – sisters or brothers, cousins or 
sweethearts.21 Another characteristic of 11M is the 
intertwining of terrorist and petty crime networks. 
The young perpetrators of the attacks were primarily 
delinquents involved in drug trafficking.
The majority of European jihadists are unqualified im-
migrant workers, in contrast to those of New York. 
Among them, the proportion of unemployed is higher 
than the average for European countries. The aver-
age age of the youth carrying out the Madrid attack 
was 27. For Petter Nesser, the process of radicaliza-
tion varies from one individual to another. His reflec-
tion focuses in particular on what motivates their indi-
vidual choice.22 Their militancy and their motivation 
have a primarily ideological basis, to the point where 
converts are attracted to Salafism because they are 
seeking an ideology rather than a faith.23
Foreign fighters, the soldiers of the Caliphate, who 
have “migrated” (carrying out their hegira) to Syria 
since 2011, or who remain put, are presented as youth 
with a criminal record and often a low level of educa-
tion who are marginalized in their society or commu-
nity. The report published by the International Centre 
for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence 
establishes a link between criminality and terrorism, 
indicating the disproportionate number of youth with a 
criminal past among the foreign fighters in Syria or act-
ing locally. Other reports emphasize the “ghettoes” in 
European countries that have become hotbeds of ji-
hadism due to unemployment rates, delinquency, and 
sentiments of social and geographical marginalization 
experienced by youth, who take refuge in Salafist ide-
ology.24 Moreover, recruiters’ strategies would seem 
to lie in developing discourse that meets the needs of 
these young people with a criminal past.25 
These “homegrown terrorists” in 
France, Great Britain and Germany, 
despite different contexts, express 
their discontent similarly, i.e. through 
violence, turning old grievances 
– such as the colonial past – into new 
aspirations, namely, a will for local 
and transnational autonomy
By the same token, suicide bombings have been re-
placed by suicidal acts. For perpetrators of suicide 
bombings, the body is the weapon and bears wit-
ness to their sacrifice, to the sense of altruism that 
leads them to suicide, a way of ensuring they belong 
to a “community” and gaining the trust of its mem-
bers.26 The suicidal act, however, is carried out with 
weapons of a different nature, ranging from knives 
to lorries operated by a single individual, who will 
sooner or later be arrested by the police.
19 Javier Jordán, Fernando M. MAñAS and Nicola horSBurgh, “Strengths and Weaknesses of Grassroot Jihadist Networks: The Madrid 
Bombings,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2008, p. 17-39.
20 Scott AtrAn, Talking to the Enemy, Faith, Brotherhood, and the (UN) Masking of Terrorists. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2010, p. 194.
21 Ibid., p. 206.
22 neSSer, op. cit.
23 Mark huBAnd, “Radicalization and Recruitment in Europe: The UK Case,” in Magnus rAnStorp (ed.), Understanding Violent Radicalisation, 
Routledge, 2010, p. 131.
24 Arturo vArvelli (ed.), Jihadist Hotbeds: Understanding Local Radicalisation Processes, ISPI 2016. www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/
pubblicazioni/jihadist.hotbeds_ebook_0.pdf 
25 Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures, op.cit., 2016.
26 Riva kAStoryAno, op. cit. 2015
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The age of the young people also marks a differ-
ence between the youth who mobilized for al-Qae-
da and those joining the Islamic State. There are 
many under 20 who have joined the movement, do-
ing their hegira in Syria, becoming foreign fighters 
and then returning to their countries of citizenship. 
But the latest attacks in Europe are the work of 
much older jihadists. The studies also indicate the 
feminization of the phenomenon. They are “invited” 
or say they are “attracted” by images promising 
them heaven on earth if they participate in jihad. The 
press publishes messages and photos circulating 
on social networks, images of sumptuous festivities, 
selfies showing smiling men intended to demon-
strate happiness and peace restored.27 It is impor-
tant to display the well-being and goodwill reigning 
there to attract young women as well, who are 
sought after in marriage, and to recall that the Islam-
ic State grants subsidies to youth who join their or-
ganization and their cause,28 and even more so to 
ensure the future of the movement.
Imagined Global Diaspora
Homegrown jihadists fight states engaged in war 
against terrorism, which they redefine as war on Is-
lam.29 They thus place Islam, a non-territorial affilia-
tion, on the same level as the territorialized states of 
which they are citizens. Their double nationality 
means they hold passports allowing them to cross 
real state borders in order to reach the imaginary 
Ummah. A homegrown terrorist is thus the product 
of this multiplicity of references characteristic of 
plural societies. 
When a branch of al-Qaeda, the al-Nusra Front, set-
tled on the border between Syria and Iraq, pro-
claimed itself the “Islamic State,” indicated it had 
conquered Baghdad and Mosul, appointed Al-
Baghdadi as its caliph, and expanded its land by 
conquering neighbouring areas, eventually attaining 
a surface area equivalent to Great Britain, it con-
firmed the importance of the territory, attesting to its 
function as a war tactic and expansion strategy, al-
though these conquests have no legitimacy in inter-
national law nor for the states concerned. These 
lands attract youth from the diaspora, but not only: 
they come from Europe, the Caucasus and Asia, 
joining local tribes to constitute an “army.”
Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State coincide ideologi-
cally, according to Bernard Haykel, insofar as they 
are both the product of Islamist renewal that seeks 
to strengthen the power of Muslims vis-à-vis those 
they define as “enemies of Islam.”30 Whereas al-
Qaeda launched “deterritorialized” global jihad 
through networks and a decentralized organization, 
the propaganda of IS calls on youth to migrate to 
Iraq and Syria (hegira -migration- to al-Sham, i.e. to 
Syria), recalling their religious duty to join “the Cali-
phate” and emphasizing that this migration is done in 
the name of jihad.31 Such an organizational differ-
ence reveals the different conception of power and 
of the association between power and territory. As 
the name indicates, the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria (Al-Sham, referring to Greater Syria in ideolog-
ical language) expresses the intention of building a 
state, appointing a Caliph, defining its territory, ac-
cording to them, following the example of the Proph-
et, and planting their flag as a symbol of unity of a 
people and their cause, the Black Flag like the one 
brandished by the Prophet in his war against the in-
fidels, as their rhetoric goes.32 Moreover, printing 
their own currency, creating an army and obtaining 
weapons and land are at the heart of the self-pro-
claimed Caliphate’s strategy.
The two organizations also coincide in the force of 
their discourse and rhetoric on their forming part of 
the Ummah. Since al-Qaeda, youth have been pre-
27 Aris rouSSinoS, “Jihad Selfies: These British Extremists in Syria Love Social Media,” Vice, 5 December 2013, www.vice.com/read/syrian-
jihadist-selfies-tell-us-a-lot-about-their-war.
28 Rick noACk, “Here’s how the Islamic State compares with real states,” Washington Post, 12 September 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/09/12/heres-how-the-islamic-state-compares-to-real-states/?Post+generic=%3Ftid%3Dsm_twitter_
washingtonpost
29 Rick “Ozzie” nelSon and Ben BoduriAn, A Growing Terrorist Threat? Assessing “Homegrown” Extremism in the United States, CSIS 
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program Report, March 2010.
30 Bernard hAykel, “The origins of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State,” in ANNALS, AAPSS, 668, November 2016, p. 71-81
31 Abdul Bari AtWAn, Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate, London, Saqi Books, 2015, p. 164
32 William MCCAntS, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 
2015, p. 25-27
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paring for jihad through websites, where they be-
come familiarized with the discourse radical Islamic 
leaders, who are attracting them through a singular 
narrative of membership in the Ummah, the reimag-
ined global community, where the concepts of be-
longing to a nation, a religion and a land are merged. 
The discourses on the Ummah refer to a new “imag-
ined geography” as a delocalized or “deterritorial-
ized,” denationalized representation of the world.33 
The leaders thus address Muslim youth of the dias-
pora as that of a people who constitute “all parts of 
the body of the Ummah,” recalling the hadith: “The 
Ummah is like our body. If part of it is hurt, the whole 
body suffers.” These youth, who recognize them-
selves in this imagined transnational community, con-
stitute the Ummah’s army, which is ready for jihad. 
Patrick Cockburn asserts that the mobilization for the 
Islamic State is much more significant and better or-
ganized than the one for al-Qaeda.34 And the author 
emphasizes that its controlling a territory that was 
originally much more extensive than al-Qaeda would 
have imagined constitutes a much more alarming 
threat.35 Its recruitment is also more systematic. Its 
leaders target disadvantaged neighbourhoods in Eu-
ropean cities with large Muslim populations, Roubaix, 
Brussels, Paris and the Seine-Saint-Denis depart-
ment, and council estates in France. These ethnic en-
claves, ghettos, all of these areas where foreignness 
and poverty combine, where youth unemployment far 
surpasses national averages, are presented as plac-
es of conflict between civil society and the forces of 
order, between generations and cultures, between 
national, local and community institutions.36 IS desig-
nates local recruiters to act on site, working closely 
with networks in Syria or elsewhere. And insofar as 
the self-proclaimed Caliphate, al-Baghdadi, in Mosul, 
recalls the duty of jihad as a unifying force of the Um-
mah and has all his young fighters, thereafter called 
foreign fighters, “swear allegiance to the Caliphate.” 
But despite the call to territorial jihad, all reports 
agree on the threat the organization represents, 
above all regarding the intentions of these foreign ji-
hadists in Syria to act anywhere in the world, in par-
ticular in their countries of citizenship. According to 
Bruce Hoffman, the Islamic State prepares opera-
tions outside of Syria thanks to its networks in Eu-
rope.37 He believes Syria constitutes a geographic 
and operational platform that projects its influence 
and power in multiple directions,38 which makes ter-
ritorial jihad, global jihad.
In the face of strikes by the coalition that have re-
duced the territory of the Islamic State, the soldiers 
of the Caliphate are pursuing their action in a “delo-
calized” or “deterritorialized” manner, without the 
obligatory passage through the “ancestral land,” but 
rather through attacks wherever they feel appropri-
ate, thus recalling the objective, which is at once 
territorial, in the “construction of a state” with the 
territorial Caliphate in the manner of empires, and 
global, insofar as it implements networks of its im-
agined diaspora thanks to its foreign fighters.
The discourse on the construction of the Ummah as 
a global nation is based on identifying its members 
as a unit with multiple affiliations (national, territorial, 
religious, linguistic), shared experiences (coloniza-
tion, exile or emigration) and a reference to a de-
nationalized, delocalized “us” established in both 
so-called diaspora spaces and in national spaces at 
the same time.39 The diaspora is represented as the 
ancestral land and the land of jihad, in the French 
case the diaspora space does not include the par-
ents’ country but refers to Syria, defined as the land 
of the Caliphate, now imagined as the ancestral 
land of resistance, the land to be reconquered and 
for which one must fight, a land that is not the fight-
ers’ parents’ country of origin allowing diasporic ties 
to be made, but an “imagined global diaspora” in 
reference to the Caliphate.
This back and forth between the local – territorial – 
and the global in radical Islamism, the changing pro-
files of its dispersed fighters and soldiers, the limit-
less imagination of war weapons, all of these consti-
tute a new challenge for states in their struggle 
against radicalization.
33 Riva kAStoryAno, op. cit., Paris, Fayard 2015
34 Patrick CoCkBurn, The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution, London, Verso, 2015, p. 38
35 Patrick CoCkBurn, op. cit., 2015, p. 42
36 Riva kAStoryAno, La France, l’Allemagne et leur immigré. Négocier l’identité, Paris, Armand Colin, 1995, Chapter 3.
37 Bruce hoFFMAn, “The Global Terror Threat and Counterterrorism Challenges Facing the Next Administration,” in CTC Sentinel, November/
December 2016, Vol. 9, Issue 11, p. 1-7
38 Bruce hoFFMAn, op. cit., 2016
39 Riva kAStoryAno, op. cit., 2015
